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ABSTRACT: During the 1950s, Chinese architecture underwent a significant change. The newly-
founded communist state employed a centralized system in both architectural practice and research. 
The connection between Chinese modern architecture, which was inspired by the Modernist approach 
in the West, and the architectural development in the West had been cut off. Most Chinese 
architectural professionals and scholars who were trained in North America and Europe continued to 
work for the new regime even though both professional and academic practices were reshaped and 
reoriented.  
Architectural research and practice were challenged by not only the economic shortage of resources 
but also the newly instilled socialistic ideologies as well as their applications. When the new state 
pondered on the strategic plan of Beijing development, a large debate occurred between architectural 
scholars and professionals. One side led by Liang Sicheng and Chen Zhanxiang, both educated in the 
West suggested to preserve the old Beijing while building new urban centers west to the old urban 
core. On the other side led by the Soviet advisors and some West-trained Chinese architects and 
scholars advocated replacing the old Beijing with the new developments. Both groups presented their 
research analysis and conclusions, which focused on different aspects to define the value of a capital 
city. The three-year long debate was ended when the central government decided to support the latter 
opinion. This debate was considered not only an academic debate, but also an indicator of the 
beginning of political engagement and control in architectural scholarship and practice. From then on, 
the socialistic ideology and concepts gradually replaced the initial Western versions of architectural 
understanding and models.  
This paper examines what the contextual changes for architectural practice and research was in a new 
regime with more socialistic influence. Rather than investigating the historical event of this debate, this 
study focuses on how architects and scholars from each side interacted with the governing party 
members and what the criterion were for the communist party to judge different viewpoints and 
opinions. This study will provide a case study to better understand the relationship between 
architectural scholarship and a particular political and social setting, and imply useful strategies for 
today’s scholars and professionals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1840s, generations of China’s intelligentsia 
attempted to deal with the domestic chaos inherited 
from the fall of the Imperial Court and the challenges 
raised from the capitalist Western forces which, as Karl 
Marx predicted, served as “the unconscious tool of 
history” in breaking apart stagnant and tradition-bound 
society and in creating conditions for a social revolution 
in China. This attempt marked a significant stage in 
1949 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
controlled the entire mainland China and proclaimed 
the founding of the People’s Republic. With a highly 
disciplined and tightly knit organization of the Party 
cadres who had experienced more than two decades of 
armed struggles, a powerful central governance system 
was quickly built. This system combined material 
means such as technology, knowledge and learning 
with ideological sanctions in the Soviet totalitarian form, 
and therefore exercised broader and tighter control 
over Chinese society than any previous government in 
history. Under the communist rule in the early 1950s, 
all major sectors of Chinese population – workers, 
peasants, students, and professionals—were enrolled 
in a close-meshed system of mass organization 
(Harding, 1981.). As a result, all professions, including 
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architects and architectural scholars, were quickly and 
effectively integrated into the new organizational 
system.  
The structural transformation of architectural profession 
started at the first year of the People’s Republic. As 
early as 1953, state enterprises were the primary 
employer of all architects as well as architectural 
scholars. In September 1953, the Vice-Minister of the 
Ministry of Construction, Wan Li, announced that all 
private enterprises in the design and construction 
industries would henceforth be prohibited from 
practicing in any government-funded project (People’s 
Daily, 1953.) Three years later, private practice of 
architecture was effectively and entirely terminated and 
independent professionals had disappeared as 
legitimate economic actors. In the meantime, the Party 
also successfully redefined the social and ideological 
structures of architectural scholarship by a series of 
political campaigns and resource reorganizations. 
Therefore, it is not meaningful to examine any aspect of 
China’s contemporary architecture except in the 
context of the Communist Party’s efforts to change it.  
Like other professions, the formation of architects and 
architectural scholars in modern China was derived 
from the adoption of Western learning and technology 
after China was forced to open its door to the West in 
the late 1800s. It was not until the 1920s when the first 
group of Chinese architects began their practices. All of 
them were trained overseas, mostly in North America 
and Europe. Although they were in small numbers – for 
example, only 55 members registered in the Chinese 
Architects Association until 1933 (Zou, 2001), these 
architects brought back the tradition of Western 
liberalism and academic autonomy, by which they 
conceived of their practices and research as actions 
free and independent of political control. In addition, 
unlike their counterparts in literature and arts, Chinese 
architects and architectural scholars were politically 
inactive. In China, as in the West, most architects and 
scholars normally lived in large cities, like Beijing and 
Shanghai, and were content to confine themselves to 
their areas of expertise and their practice and research 
interests. Meisner (1999) indicated that this political 
indifference actually originated from the deep 
disappointment towards the corrupt Nationalist regime 
which the Communist state replaced. Knowing little 
about the Marxism and communist ideologies, it was 
hard for Chinese architects to enthusiastically accept a 
government which proclaimed socialism and 
communism to be its aims. However, the dissatisfaction 
of former regime made them hope the new rulers could 
control the political and economical chaos and restore 
the national independence and reputation.  
On the other hand, the communists also viewed 
Chinese professional practitioners, including architects, 
in an ambiguous and suspicious way. Zhou Enlai, the 
Premier of the new government once publicly 
announced that most of China’s professionals and 
scholars has some degrees of bourgeois idealism and 
individualism (People’s Daily, 1956). When the 
communists came to power in 1949, they were facing a 
continuous dilemma: they needed the skills and 
expertise of the professionals to rebuild and modernize 
the country while these professionals were not the most 
reliably loyal followers of the Party line (Teiwes, 1987). 
As a result, the Party took a contradictory policy toward 
the professionals: on one hand, the Party continuously 
indoctrinated the professionals with communist 
ideologies in a more comprehensive and intensive way; 
on the other hand, the Party had to stimulate the 
professionals to be more productive. Especially in 
these areas that the Party lacked of its own experts, 
like architecture, the new rulers had to rely upon these 
professionals left over from the old regime. Hence, 
seeing these professionals as “a hand-maiden to its 
own political goals” (Goldman, 1987), the Party needed 
to reform the thoughts of these professionals in order to 
gain their allegiance.  
How were Chinese architects and architectural scholars 
inextricably embedded in an authoritarian ruling system 
and how was the Communist Party able to achieve the 
reform of these architects and scholars’ political views 
through ideological re-education while encouraging 
them to contribute their skills and productivity to the 
country’s modernization?  This question is intriguing 
because by 1954 the Party did not employ drastic and 
large-scale political campaigns in architectural 
professional as what had been done in Soviet Union 
and other Eastern European countries. Rather, the 
Party mainly took a series of administrative approaches 
to gradually undermine the independent power base of 
professional practice and academic activities. Also, the 
group of architects and scholars started to form social 
stratum embedded in the communist ruling system. 
This led to a bifurcation of the professionals – some 
individuals still valued the autonomy of practice and 
research while another became a part of the Party’s 
administrative apparatus. In fact, the Party took 
advantage of the struggle of these two groups and 
made effective progress to impose new rules and 
principles in architectural production and research.  
This paper examines how the cooperation of China’s 
architectural practice and research into bureaucratic 
alliances of the Communist Party ruling mechanism in 
the early 1950s. At the first part, this paper provides a 
theoretical framework of analyzing the institutional 
change of architectural practice and research and the 
new role of architectural scholarship in the new regime. 
Then, this paper discussed the interaction between the 
changing institution and the activities of architectural 
practice and research by focusing on the case of the 
strategic plan of Beijing development.  
 
1. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The examples in Nazi Germany, Soviet Union and 
other eastern European countries has indicated that 
controlling capacity of a political system depends on 
whether this system can develop a set of institutions to 
control both public and private lives of architectural 
professionals. When analyzing the behavior patterns of 
architectural practice and research activities, a 
theoretical framework is established: architectural 
practitioners can be considered the recipients of the 
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ideological, social and operational changes under the 
new regime. The ideological context focuses on the 
relationships of ideas, values, faith, and beliefs that 
individual architects and scholars accepted, supported 
or maintain the interaction with other ideas, values, and 
beliefs. The social context refers to various types of 
relationships that architects and architectural scholars 
constantly interacted in, including their relationships 
with the Part cadres, leaders, the relationships between 
individuals, and the relationships with other 
professionals and disciplines. The operational context 
focuses on the differentiation of positions, formulation 
of rules and procedures, and prescription of authority, 
by which architectural practitioners gained the materials 
and resources to exert their expertise and support their 
daily lives. 
This paradigm indicates a hypothetical prototype to 
analyze patterns of architectural practice and research 
activities. A behavior could be predicted by these three 
forces of social, operational and ideological contexts. 
That is, how an architectural scholar’s research 
activities depended upon his/her social relationships 
with the Party cadres and others who have strong 
influence on the research work, upon the availability of 
material resources to which he/she had accessed to 
support the research, and upon the degree to which 
he/she had either accepted or resisted the new 
communist ideologies. In addition, these three factors 
are also reciprocal. For example, the relationship 
between architects and the operational structure was 
heavily affected by how the individuals dealt with their 
own social relationship with others and whether they 
were expected to follow “appropriate” values and 
ideologies. Likewise, an architect’s interpersonal 
relationship with significant others was partially 
dependent upon whether the significant other 
cooperated or competed in operational structure, and 
upon whether the significant other held the same or 
opposite values and beliefs. Hence, if the practitioner 
had a positive relationship with the significant others, 
and if the practitioner played an important role in the 
operation, he would easily accept the values and 
beliefs that he was expected to follow.  
 
2. CHANGES IN THE EARLY 1950S  
 
What differentiated the Chinese Communist Party’s 
practice of the early 1950s from those of previous 
regimes was the degree to which lucrative or powerful 
positions were monopolized by the state sector and the 
inability of the highly educated to exit voluntarily from 
state employment. Having established the People’s 
Republic in October 1949, the Party began to launch a 
series of efforts to restore the nation’s war-torn 
economy suffered from severe inflation and 
unemployment. The first duty for the new state was to 
control key sectors of economy, which were owned by 
Western capitalists, mainly British, American and 
French firms. Secondly, the new state had to restore 
normal economic order, which required the government 
to impose managerial and supervising rules and 
regulations to organize economic activities. Then, the 
Party needed to instill its communist and socialist 
orders to guide economic growth. Hence, it was vital to 
reduce the conflicts between different economic sectors 
to a minimum and to establish an effective system to 
carry out the government’s plans. As a result, 
nationalization of all private enterprises was not only 
important to build a socialist and communist order, but 
was inevitable in practice. The conduction of 
nationalization directly led to the changes in operational 
factors.  
By 1950, most of foreign bourgeoisie were immediately 
confiscated or nationalized without any compensation. 
By 1952, most of the Western faculty and 
administrative staff had departed and all private control 
in higher education had been eliminated (Pepper, 
1987). There were few foreign architectural firms in 
China during 1949. Most Western-based architects left 
China as early as 1937 when the Sino-Japan war 
started – some of them completely withdrew from the 
Asian market while some transferred their offices to 
Hong Kong or Singapore. Some major domestic firms 
which once thrived in China’s design market had also 
moved their offices to Taiwan or Hong Kong right 
before the communists’ arrival, including, Ji-Tai 
Associates, a major player in domestic market with 
more than 110 projects completed by 1949 (Yang, 
2007).  
The Nationalization of domestic architectural firms was 
actually initiated before the birth of the People’s 
Republic in October 1949. The Communist authority 
founded the state-run Northern China Construction 
Company on August 10, 1949 as the first architecture 
and construction entity recognized by the new ruler 
(Zou, 2001). This company successfully recruited 
architects and engineers from all over China by offering 
better salaries and benefits. Zhuang Jun, who was a 
graduate from the University of Illinois and also 
founded the first domestic architectural firm in China, 
recalled that the communists cadres came to Shanghai 
and presented the job offer to invite him to work in the 
company in October 1949 –“they were asking me 
warmly and friendly to participate in a historical work of 
building the new capital for the people’s government. 
They brought me a special offer of a provided 
residence with built-in bathrooms, which was luxurious 
during that period.” (Fang, 2006). As a result, Zhuang 
closed his 25-years-old firm and joined this state 
company with his 50 subordinates and students. In 
October 1949, the Beijing Military Commission, which 
was the provisional governing entity of the city, planned 
to found state-run Yong Mao Construction Company 
with special emphasis on Beijing’s architectural and 
construction market. Three major private enterprises 
were incorporated – Ji-Tai’s Beijing Branch Office led 
by an elite architect, Yang Tingbao, a University of 
Pennsylvania alumnus, Long Hu Architects led by 
architect Zhu Zhaoxue, who was educated in France 
and Belgium, and Gu Chengpeng Architects from 
Shanghai (Zou, 2001). In December 1951, Chen Zhi, 
another University of Pennsylvania alumnus and one of 
the three principles of the Allied Architects, the largest 
domestic private architectural firm, received an 
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invitation from his former students in the Shanghai 
Municipal Government to join a proposed state-run 
Eastern China Design Company. Chen discussed this 
with two other principals and all agreed to terminate 
private practice within six months and to join in the new 
company. All three principals refused special stipends 
from the new company (Guo, 2005). By 1953, most 
middle-size and large-size architectural firms had been 
either merged or re-organized into city-or province-
based design institutes ran by the state. Prominent 
members of architectural professionals were assigned 
leading positions in the new entities with considerable 
benefits and privileges.  
The nationalization was also completed in higher 
education. Most of architectural faculty remained in 
their positions while all prominent members found extra 
appointments in the governmental administrative 
apparatus. Liu Dunzhen, department chair of 
architecture at the National Central University (the 
name changed into the Nanjing University after 1949) 
and famed by his study in traditional Chinese 
architecture, was appointed in Nanjing City Cultural 
Commission and Jiangsu Province Cultural 
Commission. Liang Sicheng, a prominent alumnus of 
University of Pennsylvania and also the department 
chair at the distinguished Tsing Hua University, 
became the deputy director of the Beijing Urban 
Planning Committee, which was in charge of all 
planning, design and construction of Beijing.  
Nationalization of architectural practice and research 
had produced two immediate consequences. First, all 
architects and architectural scholars became the state’s 
employees, which had completely changed their 
working nature. It meant that they did not have the 
freedom to choose their works and occupations any 
more. Before 1949, they were able to move between 
sectors- sometimes by choice, sometimes by necessity-
and such occupational flexibility gave this stratum a 
critical degree of autonomy from the state. After 1949, 
legitimate professional activities were limited to the 
public sector. Not only were disaffected professionals 
and managers unable to retreat to private lives, but 
they were also not even permitted to resign from their 
jobs without securing approval from the very superiors 
from whom they wished to escape. In addition, being 
state employees, architects and scholars must conduct 
their works in a well-defined institutional framework and 
circulate their opinions only through authorized 
channels. As the Party paid the salaries and took the 
responsibility for the living and working conditions of 
architects and scholars, it gradually imposed an 
operational control before an ideological conformity 
could be achieved. Secondly, the nationalization 
generated two strata of architects and scholars – the 
establishment ones and these who preferred 
independence. Establishment architects could enjoy 
protections and privileges only through their 
cooperation with the powerful state. As a result, “By 
playing assigned roles as supporters of the 
establishment and the servants of the state, they gain 
patriotic self-esteem, outlets for their publications, 
power over their peers, and opportunities for scarce 
commodities such as housing and travel abroad.” 
(Israel, 1986). On the other hand, these who remained 
autonomy and independence would find it was extreme 
hard and dangerous to work in a way outside of the 
state’s system and without bureaucratic alliances. It 
was obvious that during the early 1950s the Party 
considered transforming elite architects and prominent 
scholars into establishment ones the primary task to 
achieve the operational control.  
The change of operational factors resulted in changes 
of social contexts. Before 1949, Chinese architects and 
architectural scholars usually established their 
socialization networks by their educational 
backgrounds – the schools that they attended, the 
teachers that they learned from, or the disciplines that 
they majored in. People tended to be closer to these 
who graduated from the same school or shared 
experiences of being one’s students. The inner circle of 
personal relationships based upon educational 
background often determined architects’ and scholars’ 
career choices. For example, when Liang Sicheng 
founded architectural program at the Northeast 
University in 1928, he invited his classmates, Chen Zhi 
and Tong Jun from University of Pennsylvania to be 
faulty there. When the Northeast University was 
dismissed due to Japanese invasion in 1931, Chen Zhi, 
Tong Jun and Zhao Shen, all University of 
Pennsylvania alumni, founded Hua Gai Architects in 
Shanghai. These graduated from engineering programs 
while working as architects would feel difficult to enter 
the social circle of architects graduating from 
architectural programs. However, the nationalization 
changed the personal socialization circles. People from 
different educational backgrounds had to work 
together, which consequently resulted in conflicts 
among interpersonal relationships. For example, when 
serving for the Beijing Urban Planning Committee, 
Liang Sicheng, the deputy director, struggled with Hua 
Nangui, the chief engineer of the committee, about 
whether architects or engineers should take the major 
roles in urban planning (Liang, 1986).  
In addition, the Party’s special emphasis on the stratum 
of elite and its effort to transform them into 
establishment ones caused the spectrum of political 
participation in terms of the interpersonal relationships 
with high-level Party cadres. The elite architects and 
scholars were normally assigned high-level positions in 
the new-established administrative apparatus and 
therefore they gained more direct access to interact 
with high-level Party cadres. Some elite members, like 
Liang Sicheng and Hua Nangui, could not only have 
frequent chances to meet with senior Party cadres like 
the Mayor of Beijing or the Minister of Construction, but 
also had direct channel to communicate with the 
highest level Party leaders. In 1950s, Liang sometimes 
had written letters to the Premier Zhou Enlai when he 
found that he could not convince lower level cadres 
(Liang, 1986). The social status and personal 
connection played a determining role in architectural 
practice and scholarship. For expressing critical 
opinions in 1956, Liang Sicheng received drastic 
criticism while still remaining in his job. But Chen 
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Zhanxiang, a middle-level city design expert, was 
considered as a “rightist’ and was sent to a labor camp 
at Beijing’s countryside for re-education. The different 
treatment derived not only from the content of opinions 
and means of dissemination but also from the status of 
the two men.  
For Chinese architects and architectural scholars, the 
transition to socialism meant less independence and 
freedom. The virtually objectives of the continuous 
changes in operational and social contexts were to 
subject Chinese architects and scholars to processes 
of thought reform and ideological re-molding. It was 
noted that unlike other political campaigns against 
“counterrevolutionaries” which were aimed to eliminate 
political dissent in general, the ideological campaigns 
focusing on Chinese professionals had specific goals of 
not destroying these social groups but rather 
establishing the political loyalty and preserving their 
expertise and talents to serve the new society. In 1951, 
the Party initiated the first political campaign towards all 
Chinese intellectuals to reorient them away from the 
Western theories and scholarships in which most of 
them had been trained and to transit towards Soviet 
theories and scholarships. The aim was to expunge 
Western liberal values and indoctrinate the intellectuals 
with Marxism-Leninism (Goldman, 1987). However, as 
this campaign targeted all Chinese intellectuals, these 
in literature, humanities and arts, who the Party was 
primarily concerned, were the most affected. This 
ideological campaign allowed Chinese professionals, 
scientists, and engineers more leeway as their works 
were more abstract and more theoretical and the Party 
lacked the knowledge and skills to understand. More 
importantly, these expertise and skills were crucial for 
the Party to restore and develop economy. Therefore, 
although Chinese architects and architectural scholars 
were inevitably affected by the Party’s ideological 
control and thought reform, there was a relative 
relaxation in the ideological contexts during the early 
1950s.  
 
3. THE DEBATE OF BEIJING DEVELOPMENT 
PLAN IN THE EARLY 1950S 
 
After the Liberation Army took over Beijing in January 
1949, the Communist Party leaders decided to choose 
Beijing as the capital city for the future People’s 
Republic (Mao, 1991). In April 1949, when the 
provisional city government, Beijing Military 
Administration Committee convened two meetings to 
discuss Beijing’s urban development for the new 
regime. All elite architects and architectural scholars 
who were in Beijing were called to participate in the 
meetings. Zhong Sen, a principal from a private firm -- 
Long Hu Architects, suggested setting up a 
governmental entity to act as the administrative role 
and make policies in Beijing’s urban development. The 
Party accepted the suggestion and established the 
Beijing Urban Planning Committee on May 22, 1949. 
The provisional mayor, Ye Jianyin (who became one of 
the ten marshals in Communist China later), was the 
director and several elite architects and architectural 
scholars, including Liang Sicheng, Hua Nangui, Zhong 
Sen and Wang Mingzhi, were assigned as members of 
the committee (People’s Daily, 1949). The reports 
about this establishment published by the Party’s main 
mouthpiece, the People Daily, was titled as “the 
People’s Government Invited Experts to Form the 
Urban Committee”, which demonstrated a fact that the 
Party had to face – although the Party possessed 
strong political powers armed by Marxism-Leninism, it 
still lacked sufficient capability and skills in some key 
areas, like city development. This caused the Party to 
primarily rely upon the Western trained professionals, 
one of the least politically reliable groups.  
However, the first conflict occurred not between the 
Party cadres and the professionals, but rather, it was 
from the architectural scholars themselves. In June 
1949, Hua Nangui, the chief engineer of the committee, 
presented his proposal of Beijing development “the 
Outline of the 1st Session of New Urban Planning of 
Beijing”. Hua proposed to rebuild the old city of Beijing 
by removing the city walls and preserving the most 
important traditional complexes, including the 
Forbidden City and the Temple of Heaven. Hua also 
considered developing modern traffic system the 
primary work. Liang Sicheng intensely opposed this 
proposal as he thought the city would be split by traffic 
systems. More importantly, Liang regarded both the old 
city and the city walls as the outstanding patterns of 
traditional Chinese architecture and it was vital to 
conserve all these structures as a living museum of 
architecture. In order to prove his opinion, in 
September 1949 Liang wrote a letter to Nie Yongzhen 
(who replaced Ye Jianyin in August 1949 and also 
became one of the ten marshals in Communist China 
later), the Mayor of Beijing, to stress that engineers 
were not capable of engaging in urban planning and 
the government should allow more architects to involve 
in Beijing’s urban development: 
 
“It is most important to understand the 
differences of capabilities and responsibilities 
among architects, engineers, and construction 
contractors. Most people do not know this…The 
knowledge of engineers is confined to 
construction structures and materials. On the 
other hand, in addition to understand building 
structures and materials, architects must take 
four to five years of rigorous studies to 
understand basic human needs. An architect’s 
work is to achieve possible maximum in spatial 
beauty and uses based on the minimum of 
materials and land… I hope our new government 
to understand this difference between architects 
and engineers first. “ (Liang, 2001).  
 
Liang also implied that the Party should employ people 
with sufficient architectural experience to become the 
Party cadres who would lead architectural practice and 
urban development (Liang, 2001). Being the academic 
pioneer of traditional Chinese architecture, Liang 
considered Beijing, which had served as the Capital 
City of China for over 850 years, the best-preserved 
imperial city in the world with a large intact palace 
complex, the Forbidden City, the most complete city 
ARCC 2009 - Leadership in Architectural Research, between academia and the profession, San Antonio, TX, 15-18 April 2009 
wall system, and a large number of traditional 
residential patterns of courtyard houses and Hutongs 
(Liang, 2001). Therefore, in February 1950, Liang and 
Chen Zhanxiang, a city planning expert trained from the 
University of Liverpool, presented a rough planning 
proposal and suggested building the new city center at 
the western suburban area in order to give rooms for 
new development while preserving the old city and 
patterns of traditional architecture. This proposal, called 
Liang-Chen proposal, pointed the main problems in the 
existing old city: 1) the high density of the old city 
(21,400 people per square kilometer) made no 
sufficient space for new central governmental offices 
and residence for their staffs, not ever mention land 
and space for future development; 2) having developed 
for over centuries, the old city of Beijing had already 
formed an intrinsic urban order with a definite south-
north axis, the imperial palace at the center and all 
clear-oriented urban blocks; and 3) the existing city wall 
system was a major physical obstacle of further 
development for the old city (Liang, 2001). More 
importantly, Liang-Chen proposal studied the history of 
Beijing and demonstrated that the center of the capital 
city had changed various times in history according to 
new needs. Therefore, when a new regime was 
founded, it was possible to re-establish the city center 
in a different location. As what Liang described, the key 
of this proposal was “win-win” to “preserve the old city 
and to build a new and modern city.” (Liang, 2001).  
However, the Party was obviously not quite satisfied at 
this proposal. Liang and Chen had made more than 
100 copies of this proposal and submitted to the 
Central Government, Beijing City Government, and the 
Beijing Branch of the Chinese Communist Party (Liang, 
2001). There was no response at all. Two months later, 
Liang wrote a letter directly to the Premier Zhou Enlai 
to urge the decision-making. What Liang and Chen did 
know was that in the Party’s eyes, the urban 
development of Beijing was not purely architectural and 
urban, but a political issue. First, Liang-Chen proposal 
ignored the importance of Tiananmen Gatetower, 
where Chairman Mao proclaimed the founding of the 
People’s Republic and where the starting point towards 
the imperial palace – the Forbidden City. Building a 
new city center at the western suburban areas would 
definitely decrease the political meaning of Tiananmen. 
In addition, the south-north axis throughout the entire 
Beijing old city clustered the most sacred space – the 
center of political power -- in recent China’s history. 
Continuously using this axis in the new regime gave a 
psychological benefit to the new rulers and also sent a 
strong message to the Chinese people that the 
communist party had fully inherited the governing 
authority all over China. Chairman Mao once 
complained that “why those old emperors could live 
there while I could not?” Secondly, the Chinese 
Communist revolution of 1949 was not a “proletarian 
revolution” defined by Marxism as the Chinese 
proletariat was still in small number and remained 
politically dormant. In the Communists’ eyes, cities 
were viewed as bastions of conservatism, the 
strongholds of counter-revolutionary activities, the 
centers of foreign imperialism, and the breeding 
grounds for social inequalities, ideological impurities 
and moral corruptions. The Party considered itself not 
only the occupier, but also liberators of the cities. In 
1949, there was only 4% Beijing residents were 
workers, far behind the average level for other socialist 
capital cities (Dong, 2006). Therefore, to build a 
“People’s Beijing”, it was crucial to increase the number 
of workers in this socialist capital city. The old city of 
Beijing had few factories as well as few workers. If 
building a new city outside of the old one, the lack of 
proletariat power in the old city would remain and the 
Party would feel hard to establish an effective control 
without a solid proletarian foundation. A city without 
sufficient number of workers, who were defined by the 
Marxism and Leninism as the backbone of people, 
could not claim itself “a people’s city.” In 1953, 
Chairman Mao asked Liu Ren, the Second Secretary of 
the Beijing Branch of the Communist Party, “if we do 
not have enough workers in Beijing, shall we consider 
to move our capital to another place?” (The Beijing 
Branch of the Communist Party, 2000). 
In the meantime, a group of Soviet advisors had arrived 
in Beijing and brought the experience of building 
socialist capital of Moscow. In December 1949, the 
Soviet advisors presented a report, “Suggestions on 
Improving Beijing’s Municipal Facilities”,  to the Beijing 
City Government. This report clearly stressed that 
Tiananmen Gatetower be the spatial core of New 
Beijing and also suggested building the state’s new 
executive center along the Chang’an Street, the east-
west oriented main street in front of the imperial 
Forbidden City, to form an east-west axis as a 
subordinate axis to the dominant south-north axis. 
Based upon the Soviet report, some Chinese architects 
worked out a detailed design proposal. In April 1950, 
Zhu Zhaoxue and Zhao Dongri presented “the Opinions 
about the Capital Urban Development Plan”, in which 
Zhu and Zhao supported to reuse the old city for the 
new city center by conserving some key traditional 
buildings while demolishing large numbers of decayed 
buildings for the new development. Zhu and Zhao’s 
proposal highlighted the special meaning of Tiananmen 
Gatetower by continuing using it as the center of 
Beijing and suggested making good use of existing 
buildings for the new government. In addition, this 
proposal satisfied the economic needs – reusing the 
old city would be cost much lower than building a new 
city and maintaining an old one (Dong, 2006).  More 
importantly, this proposal met the demands from both 
the Party leaders and the Soviet advisors. First, the 
headquarters of the Communist Party had stationed at 
the suburb Beijing.  Reusing the old city would allow 
the Party leaders move into the old city of Beijing, 
offering them a more comfortable place than humble 
houses in the countryside. Secondly, most of the 
Party’s cadres were from poor peasants so that they 
usually were intermingled with strong feeling of 
suspicion toward cities. This became a notion deeply 
ingrained in these cadres’ mind when they perceived 
old buildings and traditional blocks, which were viewed 
as symbols of old society and old life styles and should 
ARCC 2009 - Leadership in Architectural Research, between academia and the profession, San Antonio, TX, 15-18 April 2009 
be removed in the new socialist capital. Zhu-Zhao’s 
proposal fulfilled their desires by replacing the old city 
with new buildings and development. Thirdly, the Soviet 
advisors considered that building a new city outside of 
the old one violated socialist principles as it resulted in 
gradually abandonment of the old city as well as its 
inhabitants. A socialist state should place priority on 
promoting people’s lives and fulfilling their needs. 
Finally, the proposal demonstrated that it was possible 
to redefine the meaning of Tiananmen Gatetower as 
well as the Tiananmen Square from a imperial center of 
backwardness into a symbol of the socialist 
consolidation. 
In a debate, a Soviet advisor released that it was 
actually Chairman Mao who had already decided to live 
in the old city:  
 
“We are informed by the Mayor, Comrade Peng 
Zhen, that he has discussed this issue with 
Chairman Mao. Mao told him that the major state 
apparatuses would be located within the old city 
while the secondary apparatuses could be 
located outside. We agree that it is a right 
decision, also the most economic solution.” 
(Dong, 2006, p.8) 
 
Although it was clear that the highest level authority 
had stated their attitude, the Party never announced 
publicly which proposal it chose.  Also, there was no 
response to Liang-Chen Proposal. Behind the silence 
of the Party, the construction of building new 
governmental offices along the Chang’an Street had 
started, following the suggestions by the Soviet 
advisors and Zhu-Zhao proposal.  During the entire 
debate, Liang and Chen actually underwent harsh 
criticism from their colleagues, most of which used 
political notions and terms.  Some architects criticised 
Liang and Chen hold capitalist and exploiters’ 
worldviews as their proposal did not aim to promote the 
life conditions of people living in the old city (Liang, 
2001). Some questioned Liang and Chen’s political 
attitudes as their proposal displayed strong affections 
towards the imperial honor of the past while 
disregarding the great revolutionary achievement of the 
present (Liang, 2001). More seriously, Liang and Chen 
were attacked to attempt to ignore the “importance of 
the Tiananemen as the political center and the symbol 
of the new regime’s consolidation” (Wang, 2003). 
However, the Party organ had not publicly criticised 
Liang and Chen, largely confining itself to reporting 
some opinions from both sides. The low key played by 
the Party demonstrated that the Party did not want to 
be blamed to make decisions mainly based upon 
political reasons. In order to restore the nation’s 
industry and economy, the professionals’ help and 
cooperation were vitally needed. Hence, in the early 
People’s Republic era, the Party granted architects and 
scholars a degree of academic freedom in order to win 
their cooperation in economic development and to 
promote the Party’s skills and expertise.  But, it did not 
mean that the Party could tolerate any autonomy and 
independence in architectural practice and research.  
Once the Party had its establishment architects and its 
own architects recruited from young students, the Party 
could rely less upon these non-loyal professionals and 
possessed more deliberate means to reform them. It 
was what happened in China’s architecture after 1952.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the early Communist era, the working nature and 
conditions of China’s architectural practice and 
research had been changed entirely. The communist 
party had gradually taken turns to change the 
operational, social and ideological contexts in which 
architects and architectural scholars fulfilled their 
expertise and skills. It was noted that the communist 
party took a step-by-step move to transform 
architectural professionals into establishment ones. 
The shortage of skills and expertise made the Party 
unable to assume a complete control of the profession 
in 1949. As a result, the Party first limited the Party’s 
involvement in architecture while allowing other key 
aspects to be remained as before. First, in operational 
contexts, the nationalization made all architectural 
professionals the employees of the state. In addition, 
the nationalization had provided a system with less 
academic autonomy to force the architectural 
professionals to participate in this system for both 
practical and private lives.  Hence, a professional could 
not withdraw to his/her studies or practices if he/she 
was not satisfied at the policies of the Party or the state. 
This system also defined the interpersonal relationships 
between professionals as well between them and other 
people. The elite and prominent architects and scholars 
were encouraged to be transformed into establishment 
ones. The Party also granted them more tolerance and 
more time for the transformation. The ideological 
campaigns would not be conducted until the Party 
achieved the strong control in both operational and 
social contexts. For these who had complied with this 
transformation, the Party would grant awards in terms 
of work position, income and other privileges. While 
those who resisted this transformation, they would 
undergo thought reforms conducted by not only the 
Party cadres, but also their colleagues who had 
completed this transformation.  
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